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GOVERNMENT RECOVERY OF INDEMNITY FROM
NEGLIGENT EMPLOYEES: A NEW FEDERAL POLICY*
EMPLOYERS are liable for the torts of employees acting within the scope
of their employment.1 But, having paid a judgment, an employer can main-
tain against the employee who committed the tort an indemnity action for
the amount of the judgment.2 For various reasons, however, employers almost
never bring such actions against their negligent workers.3
*Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 74 Sup. Ct. 275 (1953).
1. E.g., Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 142 N.E. 695 (1890) ; De Haen v. Rock-
wood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764 (1932); Brown v. Southern Ry., 202
N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932). See HARPER, ToRTs 639 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS 473
(1941); R.STATE NT, AGENCY § 219 (1933).
2. The indemnity action allows one vicariously liable for a tort to recover from the
tortfeasor. E.g., cases cited in note 6 infra; PRossER, ToRTs 1114 (1941) ; RESTATE=ENT,
RESTITUTION § 76 (1937). It is entirely distinct from the contribution action which, where
allowed, permits one joint tortfeasor to recover from his co-tortfeasor. E.g., United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) ; Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292
Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928). See RESTATEE -NT, RESTITUTION § 86 (1937).
Employers can normally also recover the cost of defending the original action against
them. RESTATEMENT, RESITUTION § 80, comment b, § 96 (1937); RESTATEMENT, JUDG-
MENTS § 107, comment i (1942). However, such additional recovery may be contingent
upon the employer's having given his employee an opportunity to defend the original suit.
See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 250 (1935).
3. No especial difficulties inhere in the indemnity action itself. Possible reasons for
the failure of employers to bring indemnity actions against their employees are: (1) the
adverse effect on employee morale, (2) the inability of the employee to satisfy the judg-
ment, and (3) the opposition of labor unions.
Research indicates only six reported cases in the Twentieth Century: Opper v. Tripp
Lake Estates, Inc., 274 App. Div. 422, 84 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1948) (defendant summer camp
sued by injured plaintiff impleaded its truck driver as a third party defendant for in-
demnity) ; Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935) (defendant oil company
sued by injured plaintiff impleaded its salesman-driver for indemnity) ; State v. Yellow
Baggage & Transfer Co., 211 Wis. 391, 247 N.W. 310 (1933) (plaintiff moving company
sued its driver and another employee for indemnity after paying a judgment to the state
for damages to a bridge) ; Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div.
741, 199 N.Y. Supp. 9 (1923) (defendant company sued by injured plaintiff impleaded its
negligent employee for indemnity) ; Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437, 81 Pac. 859 (1905)
(owner of steamship having paid judgment for damages to another ship, sued his negli-
gent ship master for indemnity); Costa v. Yoachim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900)
(owner of wagon, after paying judgment for damages sustained in collision, sued his neg-
ligent driver).
Other Twentieth Century cases are commonly cited for the proposition that an em-
ployer may recover indemnity from his negligent employee. E.g., Washington Gas Light
Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896) ; Scott v. Curtis, 195 N.Y. 424, 88 N.E.
794 (1909) : Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 12, 132 So. 763 (1931). Examination of these
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The Federal Government, on the other hand, has recently adopted the policy
of claiming indemnity. 4 In many instances it has recovered either by judgment
or settlement.5 Despite one appellate holding denying the Government's as-
serted right to indemnity,O Government claims against its employees continue.-
The tort liability of the United States flows from the Federal Tort Claims
Act,: which waives the Govermnent's common law immunity from suit for
the torts of its employees. 9 Prior to the Act, claimants injured by Government
workers could be compensated by the Government only after special congres-
sional action."0 The Act was designed to relieve Congress of the burden of
cases reveals either that the party sued for indemnity was not an employee or that the
case does not involve indemnity at all and hence the proposition stated therein is dictum.
In two other recent cases employers have brought actions against their negligent em-
ployees, for different purposes. In Buhl v. Viera, 328 Mass. 201, 102 N.E.2d 774 (1952),
a druggist sued his negligent employee for the benefit of his insurance company which
had paid damages to the person injured by the employee's negligence. And in Darman v.
Zilch, 56 R-I. 413, 186 AtL 21 (1936), an automobile owner sued his chauffeur for damage
to his automobile caused by the chauffeur's negligence.
In only one case has a subrogated insurance company sued its insured's employee for
damages it has had to pay on behalf of its insured because of the employee's negligence.
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio App. 1945).
4. Communication to the YALE L.w JoURNAL from Assibtant Attorney-General (Civil
Division) Warren E. Burger, dated October 27, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
5. E.g., United States v. Lushbough, 20) F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Burks %. United
States, Civil No. 6766, S.D. Te%., August 6, 1953; Darnell v. United States, Civil No.
9703-HW, S.D. Cal., January 15, 1952: Loumakis v. United States, Civil No. 4281, N.D.
Ga., January 31, 1953.
6. Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953). For discussion of this
case, see text at note 27 infra.
7. See Pitcher v. United States, Civil No. 3896, D. Conn., June 16, 1953, presently
on appeal, Civil No. 22854, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit See also note 4 supra.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1946) : "Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 of this
title, the district courts, together with the District Court for the Territory of Alaskm, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."
9. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27-8 (1952) : "The legislative history in-
dicates that... Congress desired to waive the Government's immunity from actions for
injuries to persons and property occasioned by the tortious conduct of its agents acting
within their scope of business... ." See SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1946).
10. H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942): "[C]laims, if adjusted at all,
are handled individually by private bills, which either make a direct appropriation for the
payment of the claim, or else remit the plaintiff to suit either in the Court of Claims or
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such private bills 11 and to provide claimants with a judicial remedy against
the United States. 12
Prior to Government liability, the loss was borne by the injured victim
unless he was covered by insurance, could recover from the negligent employee,
or was compensated by private bill. Rarely was the victim fully protected by
insurance. 13 Usually the Government employee was financially unable to re-
imburse the injured party,1 4 and redress by private bill was not often forth-
coming.15 Hence the Government's assumption of liability shifted pecuniary
losses from injured parties to the Government.
in a United States district court." See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543,
548-9 (1951). See also note 11. infra.
However, heads of executive agencies had authority to settle property claims up to
$1000. 42 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U.S.C. § 215 (1946). And the heads of certain specified
executive agencies also had authority to settle injury and death claims. E.g., 50 STAT. 321
(1937), 16 U.S.C. § 584-o (1946) (Civilian Conservation Corps) ; 41 STAT. 1054 (1920),
33 U.S.C. § 853 (1946) (Coast and Geodetic Survey, subject to the approval of the Secre-
tary of Commerce) ; 49 ST.T. 1184 (1936), 5 U.S.C. § 300(b) (Supp. 1950) (Department
of Justice for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) ; 48 STAT. 1207 (1934), 5 U.S.C. § 392
(1946) (Post Office Department).
Today the heads of executive agencies are authorized to settle claims for property
damage or personal injuries or death up to $1000. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1946). And the
Attorney-General has authority to compromise or settle any claim after a suit has been
commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (1946).
11. Approximately 2000 private relief bills were introduced in each Congress during
the 25 years prior to the Act and the amount claimed has exceeded $100,000,000. How-
ever, only a small percentage of those bills ever became law. See Hearings before Judi-
ciary Commdttec on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, Appendix II
(1942) ; H.R. RE. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946).
See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1951): "The bill
became Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Bill of 1946 at a moment when the
overwhelming purpose of Congress was to make changes of procedure which would enable
it to devote more time to major public issues." And see Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 24-5 (1952).
Title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 banned private relief bills in cases
where suit could be brought under the FTCA, 60 STAT. 831. (1946).
12. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-5 (1952). See H.R. REP. No. 2245,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942) ; 3 Mooaz, FEDMAL PRACTICE 513, n.14 (2d ed. 1948).
This statutory suit is a non-jury action. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1946).
13. See HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL, ACCIDENT AND HEALTH COVERAGE IN TIlE
UNITED STATES 7 (1952). As of December 31, 1951, nearly 86,000,000 people had insur-
ance covering some hospital expenses-generally room, board, and miscellaneous services;
65,500,000 people were covered for some medical expenses, commonly for in-hospital treat-
ment and sometimes for home treatment also.
Approximately 40,000,000 of the nation's 61,000,000 employed civilians had insurance
which would provide some income during periods in which injury or illness prevented
them from working. Id. at 15. In addition, various types of insurance are provided under
federal and state government social security programs. Id. at 22.
14. See Hearings before Cononittee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and HR, 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1942). And few government employees carry liability insurance.
See note 17 infra.
15. See first paragraph of note 11 supra.
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Sound policy requires that the Government bear the cost of losses result-
ing from the negligence of its employees. Since the Government originated
the activity causing loss, and could have foreseen the probability of the loss,
it should shoulder liability as an additional expense of the activity. More-
over, the Government can distribute the cost of liability through taxation.',
Such distribution spreads the loss over a large number of people according
to ability to pay. Each taxpayer pays only a small portion of the loss, thus
avoiding the ruin which may be visited on an individual who is required to
carry the entire burden of what is to him an unpredictable loss.--
Successful prosecution of Government indemnity claims, however, will shift
the full loss back to an individual, the Government worker. Employees will be
unable to distribute the loss except through insurance. However, employees
are rarely insured against liability for negligent acts incident to their employ-
ment.' s And to insist that Government workers bear the cost of insurance
would place them in an economically disadvantageous position in comparison
with private employees, who do not fear indemnity actions "I and do not in-
sure against then. 2 1 Private employers bear the cost of insurance as a busi-
16. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Imptact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE LJ. 549, 556 (1948).
17. See James, Contribution Amwng Joint Torticasors, 54 HAtv. L RE%. 1156, 1157
(1941):
"[Another] way of looking at tort liability is to regard it as a means for dis-
tributing losses over society as a whole or some fairly large segment of it. This
approach leads to an altogether different set of consequences. Most important
among them is that some good accrues from the fact of distribution itself. It
is true that the total cost of the direct loss-through accident, for e.,ample--
cannot be diminished by its distribution and indeed, is increased by the cost which
the distribution itself entails. Social gain accrues, nevertheless, since consistent
distribution of losses over a large group tends to substitute (through the oper-
ation of the law of large numbers) a certain and calculable cost for the uncer-
tain risk of ruinous losses to individuals. This removal of risk and uncertainty,
moreover, eliminates fear inhibiting desirable enterprise, activity and progress.
Finally, the protection of its members from financial ruin or great financial
shock is a benefit to society as a whole quite apart from the gratification of
humanitarian impulses."
See also James, Accident Liability Rcconsidercd: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 549-50 (1948); Gregory, Contribulion Among Joint Tortcasors: A
Defense, 54 HALv. L. REv. 117, 171 (1941). See text at notes 13, 14 supra.
18. See Communication to the YALE LAW JoRTNAL from J. J. Forman Co., Insurance
Brokers, New York, dated December 10, 1953, in Yale Law Library. See also SE. :. REP.
No. 2025, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952) ; Statement of Assistant Attorney-General Francis
M. Shea in Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and HR. 6463,
77th ong., 2d Sess. 29 (1942).
19. See note 3 supra.
20. See note 18 supra. There appear to be no insurance -policies written to protect
against indemnity itself. However, a policy against liability would cover an employee's
liability on an indemnity action.
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ness expense 21 and attempt to distribute it to the consumer through higher
prices.
22
The indemnity action cannot be successfully defended as necessary to deter
negligence. Liability is of questionable value as a negligence deterrent.2 a And
the Government has command of other disciplinary devices-including dis-
missal and demotion-with which to combat employee negligence.2" More-
over, modern methods of preventing negligence, proved effective, are avail-
able to the Government.
2 5
Although fear that his employer may bring an indemnity action against
him may deter an employee from colluding with an injured party,20 this pos-
sible deterrent effect is not a sufficient justification for the indemnity action.
The law should not give the Government an action against all of its em-
ployees because some may be dishonest. Private employers have not found
the danger of collusion sufficiently great to justify either bringing or threaten-
ing indemnity actions. 2 7
21. See Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from J. J. Forman Co,, supra
note 18. Some large concerns are self-insurers. See, e.g., Communication to the YALE
LAW JOURNAL from John A. Dill, General Attorney, Railway Express Agency, dated No-
vember 11, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
22. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk-I, 38 YALE L.J.
584, 586 (1929); Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 433, 450 (1934).
23. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 518 at 569 (1948). Cf. Note, 62 YALE L.J. 111, 115 (1952). Moreover,
even if the government cannot collect indemnity the employee remains liable to the injured
claimant, unless the claimant recovers from the government. See note 29 infra. But see
Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 447
(1934).
24. Subject to specific procedural requirements, federal agencies have authority to
dismiss, demote, suspend, and transfer civil service employees, and to reduce their com-
pensation or withhold their promotion. 5 CODE FiE. REGs. §§ 8-9 (1949) ; id. (Cum. Supp.
1952). Cf. Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339, 341
(1934).
25. "[Tjhe large business or governmental unit is in a far better position to reduce
accidents than is the isolated individual. . . ." James & Dickenson, Accident Proneness
aud Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 780 (1950). This article suggests that psycho-
logical studies of the accident prone employee may be utilized to reduce accidents. Private
employers have successfully used techniques developed from these studies.
See also McMuRRY, HANDLING PEtsoNAaiTY ADIUSTMENTS IN INDUSTRY (1944),
where it is suggested that psychological factors are of prime importance in employee
efficiency and safety, and that employers may use psychological techniques in the selection,
training, and educating of employees with great effect in eliminating negligence and in-
efficiency.
26. This fear was judicially expressed for the first time by Harrison, D.J., in Gilman
v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion). See discussion
of this case, text at note 28 infra.
27. See note 3 supra.
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NOTES
In the recent case of Gilman v. United States,28 the Ninth Circuit denied
indemnity to the Government, reasoning primarily from an inadequate ex-
planation of the indemnity action. The court stated the rationale of indemnity
thus: "'the defendant is unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's payment of the
injured party's claim.' "2 Since the FTCA makes judgment in a suit against
the Government a bar to any action by the claimant against the employee, the
court concluded that the judgment extinguished the employee's liability to the
injured party.3 ' Hence the employee could not be enriched by the Govern-
ment's pa'yment of the judgment and was not subject to an indemnity action.
But the court's theory of indemnity does not account for those cases which
allow indemnity to the plaintiff despite the defendant's immunity from liability
28. Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953).
29. Id. at 847, quoting from Brief for Appellee, p. 7, Gilman v. United States, supra
note 28.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1946) provides: "The judgment in an action under section
1346 (b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by
reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim."
This section alters the common law rule that a claimant may obtain judgment against
all persons liable for the same tort. See PRossER, ToRTs 1106 (1941); REsTATZ,,1ET,
JDGMIENTS § 93, comment b (1942). At common law, only satisfaction of the judgment
discharges those liable on the tort. See PaossER, ToRTs 1105 (1941); RESTATr-szr.,T,
JuDGmENTS § 95 (1942). The innovation is justified by the assurance that a judgment
against the government will be satisfied.
The section was designed to permit the government to continue its practice of defend-
ing suits instituted against its employees without risking the necessity of defending two
suits. See Hcarings bcfore Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6163, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1942). See also note 34 infra. Absent this provision, the Govern-
ment might find itself defending claimant's suit against the negligent employee after it had
defended claimant's suit against itself. If the claimant lost his statutory non-jury action
against the Government he might then have proceeded against the employee, hoping to
win the common law jury action. Or if the claimant won his suit against the Government,
he might then have proceeded against the employee in the hope of receiving a larger jury
verdict. See RESTATE.MNT, REsTrruTiox § 96, comment j (1942).
A literal construction of the section would preclude an action against the employee
whenever any prior suit against the Government reaches judgment. This result is pal-
pably unfair where judgment is rendered for the Government on the grounds that the em-
ployee acted outside the scope of his employment. See note 1 supra. In such case the
claimant is deprived of his remedy against the negligent employee merely because he mis-
takenly attempted to avail himself of his statutory remedy. Cf. United States v. Lush-
bough, 200 F2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952). This result may be avoided by interpreting the vord
"judgment" in the section as meaning judgment on the merits of the tort case.
Section 2676 does not prevent duplicate suits when the claimant brings action against
the employee first. However, in such case a successful defense of the suit would bar sub-
sequent proceedings against the Government. E.g., Prichard v. Nelson, 55 F. Supp. R06
(W.D. Va. 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1943) ; REsTATEMEnT, JU GMENTS §§ 96,
99 (1942). If claimant won the suit against the employee and the judgment was not satis-
fied, the claimant may then proceed against the Government. However, the Government
often satisfies judgments against its employees. See note 34 infra.
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on the obligation which the plaintiff paid. 3' Since the defendant has not been
enriched in these cases, the basis for indemnity cannot be unjust enrichment,3"
31. E.g., Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935) (indemnity granted to
company which had paid judgment to employee's wife for negligent injury by employee
despite employee's immunity from tort suit by his wife) ; Briggs v. Philadelphia, 316 Pa,
48, 173 AtI. 316 (1934) (affirming lower court's award to city of indemnity from house
owner whose negligent maintenance of sidewalk rendered city liable to plaintiff despite
owner's immunity from tort suit from plaintiff, his minor child). Cf. Reed v. Humphrey,
69 Kan. 155, 76 Pac. 390 (1904) ; Boardman v. Paige, 11 N.H. 431 (1840) ; Haddens v.
Chambers, 2 Dallas 236 (Pa. 1795). See also Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y.
253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928), where Cardozo, J., speaking obiter, stated that indemnity would
be allowed to an employer who paid a judgment for his employee's tort to the employee's
wife despite the employee's immunity from tort suit by his wife. Compare MeLaurin v.
McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933) ; Poulin v. Graham, 102 Vt.
307, 147 AtI. 698 (1929) (both cases allowing tort suits by wife against husband's em-
ployer despite husband's immunity from suit by wife and despite employer's admitted right
to indemnity against husband), with Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr. Co., 116 Neb. 180,
216 N.W. 297 (1927) (disallowing tort suit by wife against husband's employer because
husband was immune to tort suit by wife and because employer's right of indemnity would
destroy immunity). See also RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 76, comment b, 78, comment
a, 86; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 96, comment g (1942).
Alternative theories for indemnity between employee and employer have been suggested.
Cardozo, J., in Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., supra states that the basis for indemnity
is the breach of the employee's duty to render faithful, non-negligent service to his em-
ployer. See also MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 324, 333 (3d ed. 1923) ; PROSSER, TORTs 909 (1941) ;
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, COERCION, Topic 3, p. 327 (1937); TIFFANY, AGENCY
§§ 142-5 (2d ed., Powell, 1924). Another suggested basis for indemnity is that each person
is responsible for the consequences of his own tort. Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co.,
175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903). Accord: Oceanic S.N. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica,
134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (2d Div. 1892).
32. Furthermore, the court's reasoning is faulty in that it relies on an assumption that
the court specifically declines to make. That assumption is that the right to indemnity does
not arise on judgment but arises only on satisfaction of the judgment. If the contrary is
assumed, then, by the court's theory, the Government's claim of indemnity becomes theo-
retically the same as the private employer's claim. The private employer is allowed in-
demnity because his payment to claimant discharges his employee's liability and thus un-
justly enriches the employee. If the right to indemnity arises on judgment, then the
Government would be entitled to indemnity because judgment which statutorily discharges
the employee's liability to claimant, unjustly enriches the employee. However, if the right
to indemnity arises only on payment, then the court's theory is consistent. For then, the
Government's payment to the injured party would not enrich the employee, whose liability
was discharged by the judgment, and would not give rise to indemnity. However, although
this assumption is crucial to the court's conclusion, the court explicitly declines to make
the assumption, Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 848 n.2 (1953), and does not criti-
cize the lower court for awarding indemnity to the Government on judgment and before
payment.
For the proposition that indemnity can arise only on payment, see Dunn v. Uvalde
Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903); Oceanic S.N. Co. v. Compania
Transatlantica, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (2d Div. 1892). For the statement that in-
demnity can arise on liability and before payment, see L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell,
237 P.2d 84 (Cal. App. 1952).
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A better ground for denying indemnity to the Government is that it runs
counter to the congressional intent embodied in the FTCA. This intent is
evident from the legislative history of the Act ;33 it is shown also by Con-
gress' continuing practice of reimbursing by private bill those Government
workers who have been sued instead of the Government.34 Moreover, when
Congress paid plaintiffs by private bill prior to the FTCA, the Government
could not recover indemnity from its employees.3 5 If Congress had intended
to grant the Government a right against its workers in the Act which created
33. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6163, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942):
"The Chairman. What is the arrangement when the government has an employee who
is guilty of gross negligence and injury results? Is there any requirement that that em-
ployee should in any way respond to the Government if it has to pay for the injury, in
the event of gross negligence?
[Assistant Attorney General Francis 'M.] Shea. Not if he is a Government employee.
Under those circumstances, the remedy is to fire the employee.
" Mr. McLaughin. No right of subrogation is set up?
"Mr. Shea. Not against the employee."
See also SEN. Rnr'. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942) : "It is just and desirable
that the burden of redressing wrongs of this character be assumed by the Government
alone, within limits leaving the employee at fault to be dealt with under the usual dis-
ciplinary controls."
The 77th Congress had under consideration an earlier edition of the oft-proposed
Federal Tort Claims Act which was passed by the 79th Congress in 1946. Although the
Supreme Court in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 n.8 (1951), ques-
tioned the force of the 1942 legislative history in the interpretation of the 1946 Act, the
Court in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 (1953), indicated that, concerning
issues on which the 79th Congress held no relevant hearings, the hearings and reports of
the 77th Congress must control on the question of legislative intent.
Cf. Opinion of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, 40 Ors. Atr'y GFs2. 33, 40
(1941) : ".... Congress has by general legislation progressively assumed liability to persons
sustaining injuries through negligence of officers and employees of the Government and in
doing so has not made provisions for the assertion of claims by the United States against
the officers and employees causing the damage." See, however, SEN. REP. No. 2025, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), which indicates a belief that the Government has a right to in-
demnity from its negligent employees. However, this subsequent expression of the 82d
Congress, made after the Government instituted its policy of claiming indemnity and before
indemnity was denied by the Ninth Circuit, does not state the legislative intent of the 79th
Congress, which passed the Federal Tort Claims Act.
34. See, e.g., 66 STAT. A143 (1952). See also SEN. REP. No. 2025, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1952), citing legislative precedent for this type of private bill.
The Government sometimes pays the judgments rendered against its employees for
torts arising in their employment. See SEm. REP. Nos. 2025, 2043, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952).
And the Department of Justice often defended negligent government employees when
tort suits were brought against them. See Statement of Assistant Attorney General
Francis M. Shea in Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and HI..
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1942).
35. Since private bills were voluntary payments by the Government, no right of in-
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Governmental liability for its employees' torts, it would have made its inten-
tion explicit.3 6
Government indemnity is an issue for the sole determination of Congress. 7
In view of clear congressional intent to omit the right of indemnity from the
FTCA, and indemnity's patently injurious effects, the current administrative
policy of attempting to recover indemnity from Government employees should
be discontinued. Economy does not demand so much.3 8
demnity arose. Liability of the payor is an element of his indemnity cause of action.
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 78, comments d, g; 79 (1937).
The payee's judgment against the payor binds the person from whom the payor seeks
indemnity on the liability question if the payor offered him the opportunity to defend the
payee's suit against the payor. RESTATEM-ENT, JUDGAIENTS § 107 (1942).
The payor need not wait until judgment for the payee is entered against him in order
to be entitled to indemnity. If he pays before judgment, however, he must be able to prove
his liability to the payee in order to collect indemnity. Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving
Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903).
Some cases hold that even if the payor pays the payee in response to a judgment, the
payor in order to collect indemnity must "allege and prove that judgment could not have
been avoided." E.g., Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53, 54, 20 N.E,2d 465,
466-7 (1939).
36. See note 37 infra. But see dissenting opinion of Harrison, D.J., in Gilman v.
United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953), where the view is expressed that if Congress
had meant to withhold this ordinary incident of vicarious liability, it would have clearly
stated so. However, this opinion rests heavily on the analogy of the private employer,
which the Supreme Court has stated should not be applied to the Government. See note
37 in.Ira. Moreover, Congress was doubtless aware of the fact that private employers do
not pursue such claims. See note 3 supra.
37. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947). In this
case the Government sought to recover for loss of services and for medical expenses neces-
sitated by injuries to a soldier caused by defendant's negligence. The Court denied the
Government's claim, declaring that common law precedents regarding indemnity may not
be applied to the Government to judicially create a liability which Congress by silence
declined to create. The Court held indemnity was a matter of fiscal policy for the sole
determination of Congress.
38. Indeed, economy may not be served at all. If the Government's olicy is to sue
for indemnity in all cases, it is not likely that recoveries will meet expenses. And if the
policy involves investigation of financial worth in each case, expenses are likewise liable
to exceed recoveries.
[Val. 63
